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BY P. B. PLUMB.

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THE KANZAS NEWS.

"THE PEOPLE ALWAYS CONQUER."

BY P. B. PLUMB. EMPORIA, KANZAS, JUNE 6, 1857. VOL. 1—NO. 1.

The Kanzas News.

SATURDAY,.....JUNE 6, 1857.

"History, as Expounded by the Supreme Court."

The May No. of PUTNAM'S MONTHLY contains a scorching review of the late decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case. The writer does not touch on the *legal* merits of the decision, but takes Judge TANEY to task for his falsification of the truth of History. We subjoin a few extracts:

"We have read the opinions of this court, as published, with all the care which the importance of the matter involved exacts, and we feel bound to declare them among the feeblest defenses of an unrighteous act that it has ever been our lot to encounter.—The controlling opinion, in particular, delivered by Chief Justice Taney, is weak and disingenious beyond all precedent; and it may be said of the author of it, that, while he has seldom had the felicity to distinguish himself by the wisdom or ability of his judgments, he has certainly, by this last effort, earned the unenviable eminence of having uttered the most untenable doctrine which ever emanated, on so grave a question, from his tribunal.

"In regard to the legal merits of this decision, however, we do not propose to speak: that branch of the subject has been already amply discussed in the journals, and, without them, had been set at rest, we think, in the exhaustive and annihilating opinion of Judge Curtis. With a profound knowledge of the law, which might be expected in one of his position, and a familiarity with history, in which he seems to have the advantage of most of his colleagues, he has completely overturned the few and flimsy pretenses wherewith they sought to commend their erroneous assumption of power, and their fundamental perversion of principle.—As much might be said of the opinion of Judge McLean, and both those upright magistrates—men who have ever been known for their strong conservative tendencies—who have had no novelties to introduce into jurisprudence, and no outside relations to warp their independence, and who, in resisting the departure of the other judges from the ancient ways, have only acted in perfect conformity with their settled characters—deserve the warmest thanks of every member of the community—of every class and every party. To their expositions of the law, therefore, we are willing to leave the decision of the question in the public mind.

But it happens that the opinion of Chief Justice Taney does not rest so much upon any interpretation of the law as it does upon a construction of the facts of history; and as, in that department, every student may be supposed to be as competent to judge as he is, we propose to examine the extent of his knowledge, and the accuracy of his judgment, in respect to it. Before doing so, however, let us stop for a moment to remark upon the very whimsical notion which is put forth by the adherents of the government to curb or intimidate free inquiry, to the effect that the decisions of the Supreme Court are not objects of legitimate criticism. If we might believe them, there is something so sacred in the character of this tribunal, or so infallible and conclusive in its utterances, that every attempt to show their impertinency, or their error, is a species of crime scarcely less perilous than *crimen majestatis* under the Cæsars, or less sacrilegeous than open resistance to a decree of the pope. Although the very bench which renders the decision has found its severest condemnation in the recorded opinions of some of its own members, although it has ever been the custom of our most distinguished men, Jefferson, Jackson, Justice Story, Chancellor Kent, to canvass its action with the utmost freedom, and sometimes with avowed contempt, although the most essential principle of our political structure is the responsibility of all functionaries to public sentiment, we are yet told that the judgments of the Supreme Court are not to be touched. The decree has gone forth, exclaim these reasoners, and forever after let the world hold its tongue!—The irrevocable, irreversible, fatal vermillion-edict is published, and let all gainsayers beware!

Now, such an assumption may be adapted to the latitude of China, or may not be out of place under the unconditional rule of the Czar, but is surely something new in this republic, which long since abjured all human pretensions to the divine prerogatives. Our theory of government has been, that there is nothing final in civil affairs but truth and justice—that institutions are not an authority over the people, but the ministers and servants of the people: and while this theory lasts, it cannot be allowed to any body of individuals to usurp the supreme and irresistible control of their minds.

"Pray, on what ground of reason or good sense is it inferred, that, because the judgments of the Supreme Court are final in the judicial sphere, they are also final in the political and moral sphere? Have we, in erecting that tribunal, as a mere convenience or necessity, if so be, of jurisprudence, created it, at the same time an imperial organ of despotism? Have we, who, for three hundred years have canonized Martin Luther for denying the supremacy of the Romish court in matters of religion, raised a papistical consistory among ourselves, which is no less supreme in all civil matters? Have we, who are never weary of glorifying John Hampden for refusing to confess the decision of the Twelve Judges of the Exchequer in the little matter of ship-money—about twenty shillings—conferred upon our judges, not merely all their legal authority, but an authority which may control the actions of parties and the sentiments of individuals? We certainly have done all this and more, if it is to be taken for granted that, when a majority of the federal judges have pronounced upon a question, there is an end of controversy in regard to it—if from that moment the debates of the legislative halls, the criticisms of the newspapers, the clamors of the public assembly must cease, and a sudden silence fall upon society, like that which followed an interdict of Gregory or Boniface.

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"With these views, we have no hesitation in approaching that part of Justice Taney's decision, which founds the disfranchisement of an entire race upon a misrepresentation of history. Our readers will recall that the question in the Dred Scott case was whether the plaintiff, "a negro of African descent," was entitled to sue in a court of the United States; and the chief-justice, in explaining the law of it, after he concedes that "every state may confer the right of citizenship upon any class or description of persons," denies, at the same time, that "the provisions of the constitution of the United States, in relation to personal rights to which a citizen of a state is entitled, embraces negroes of the African race, either those in the country at the time the constitution was made, or those afterwards imported, or those made free by any state." His reasons for the exception are these:

"It is true that every person, and every class and description of persons, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, regarded as citizens of the several states, became citizens of this new political body, and none other. It was formed for them and their posterity, and for nobody else; and all the rights and immunities were intended to embrace only those who were members according to the principles on which the constitution was adopted.

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"It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several states when the constitution was adopted. In order to do this, we must recur to the colonies when they separated from Great Britain, formed new communities, and took their place among the family of nations.—They who were recognized as citizens of the states, declared their independence of Great Britain, and defended it by force of arms. Another class of persons, who had been imported as slaves, or their descendants, were not recognized or intended to be included in that memorable instrument—the Declaration of Independence. *It is difficult, at this day, to realize the state of public opinion respecting that unfortunate class, with the civilized and enlightened portion of the world, at the time of the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the constitution; but history shows they have for more than a century been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and unfit associates for the white race, either socially or politically, and had no rights which white men were bound to respect; and the black man might be reduced to slavery, bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise. This opinion, at that time, was fixed and universal with the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals, which no one thought of disputing, and every one habitually acted upon it, without doubting for a moment the correctness of the opinion.* And in no nation was this opinion more fixed and generally acted upon than in England, the subjects of which government not only seized them on the coast of Africa, but took them as ordinary merchandise, to where they could make a profit on them. The opinion thus entertained was universally impressed on the colonists this side of the Atlantic; accordingly, negroes of the African race were regarded by them as property, and held, and bought, and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen colonies which united in the Declaration of Independence, and afterward formed the constitution.—The doctrine, of which we have spoken, was strikingly enforced by the Declaration of Independence. It begins thus: 'When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitles them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation;' and then proceeds: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,' etc. *The words here quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family; and, if used in a similar instrument at this day, would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race was not intended to be included;* for, in that case, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would be flagrantly against the principles which they asserted. They who framed the Declaration of Independence were men of too much honor, education, and intelligence, to say what they did not believe; and they knew that in no part of the civilized world were the negro race, by common consent, admitted to the rights of freemen. They spoke and acted according to the practices, doctrines, and usages of the day. *That unfortunate race was supposed to be separate from the whites, and was never thought or spoken of except as property.* These opinions underwent no change when the constitution was adopted. The preamble sets forth for what purpose and for whose benefit it was formed. It was formed by the people—such as had been members of the original states—and the great object was to 'secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.'"

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The difficulty with Chief Justice Taney's argument from history is, that he post-dates the period of the black-plague which ravaged human conscience by a half century at least; just as the spirit of his decision is a whole century behind his own times. A brief retrospect of the changes of opinion in regard to slavery will show this. When the slavery of the blacks was begun in the sixteenth century, it was authorized, not on the ground that negroes were "things," nor on the ground that they were Africans; but, because they were heathens or pagans, for which the perverted religious sense of those days fancied that it found a sanction in the Mosaic records. Christianity had already widely diffused the sentiment, that it would be wrong to enslave one who bore the image of Christ, but it was not thought inconsistent with that sentiment to treat Indians and negroes as the Amalekites and Canaanites had been treated by the Hebrews. The Spanish brigands, who introduced slavery into South America, did it for the good of souls: Louis XIII, of France was persuaded to consent to it, in the French colonies, on the same grounds, and Queen Elizabeth would not grant a patent to Sir John Hawkins for the slave-trade, until she was assured that the negroes left Africa voluntarily, and would receive the benefits of conversion. In Virginia, in 1682, it was declared by statute that all servants brought into the country, whether negroes, moors, mulattos or Indians, *not being Christians*, should be slaves. From New England to Carolina, says Bancroft, the notion prevailed that "being baptized is inconsistent with a state of slavery."

"But the avarice of planters and merchants soon overcame these feeble scruples, and that condition of the public mind was brought about in the following century, which Chief Justice Taney has described of a later period. Slavery, which in the ancient societies had been the result of war, "the fruit of the spear," as it was called, and which, in the middle-ages, had declined, by slow and imperceptible degrees, into the various kinds of serfage, until the direct and grosser forms of it were nearly, if not altogether extinct, assumed once more a new character and a new life as a commercial speculation. "The slave," says Arthur Helps, "was no longer an accident of war; he had become the object of war; He was no longer a mere accidental subject of barter; he was to be sought for—to be hunted out—to be produced—and slavery became a more momentous question than it had ever been before."

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"In this country, the efforts of the colonists to secure their own liberties, had brought the greater part, at an early day, to sympathize in the general movement for liberty. Slavery existed among them, but it existed as an inheritance, and not as a thing which they approved. "There is not," says Bancroft, "in all the colonial legislation of America, one single law which recognizes the rightfulness of slavery in the abstract. Every province favored freedom as such." In his address to the Virginia Convention of 1774, Jefferson said, "that the abolition of domestic slavery *is the greatest object of desire in these colonies*, where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state." They were embarrassed alone as to what to do with the servile class, even then very large. It was, however, universally supposed that by restricting the importation of slaves, the odious system would die out. The earliest continental Congress (1774)—the first union of the provinces that was ever held—accordingly agreed to a discontinuance of the slave-trade. In the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, that trade was stigmatized as "a cruel war against human nature," and the paragraph was withdrawn only at the instance of South Carolina and Georgia, not then prepared to abandon the traffic forever. By 1784, Massachusetts and New Hampshire had abolished slavery; Pennsylvania, Connecticut and Rhode Island had secured personal liberty by statute to all the future natives of those states; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia had prohibited the further introduction of persons claimed as slaves; the last two had repealed the old colonial laws against manumission by individuals; and at the close of the war, the last continental Congress proclaimed that the war of Independence, then successfully closed, had been a war—for what?—the rights of a race?—no! but "for the rights of human nature."

"What were the opinions, then, of the men who framed the Federal Constitution? What were the opinions of Washington, Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Morris, Madison, Hamilton, Franklin, Adams, Jay—and all the other leading spirits of the day? We might quote in reply sentence after sentence from the speeches or writings of these distinguished men, going to show their deep-seated abhorrence of slavery, their anxious interest in the question as to the best means of its termination—and their assurance that the curse was but transitory—destined to pass rapidly away. But the late political campaign has made their words too familiar to every reader, to need that we should cite them here. Mr. Webster, who, it is universally admitted, whatever we may think of his politics, was more profoundly versed in all the knowledge that relates to the formation of the Constitution than any other man, has forcibly but accurately described the state of feeling at the time of the Federal Convention. "It will be found," he said, "if we carry ourselves, by historical research, back to that day, and ascertain men's opinions by authentic records, still existing among us, that there was then no diversity of opinion between the north and the south on the subject of slavery. It will be found that both parts of the country held it equally an evil, a moral and political evil." "The eminent men, the most eminent men, and nearly all the conspicuous politicians of the south held the same sentiments—that slavery was an evil, a blight a curse. There are no terms of reprobation of slavery so vehement at the north at that day as in the south. The north was not so much excited against it as the south, and the reason is, that there was much less of it, at the north, and the people did not see the evil so prominently as at the south." But Mr. Webster need not to have confined his remarks to the evidences of the politicians; the churches—every leading denomination speaking through their most influential organs and teachers—were far more urgent in their denunciations than the politicians; while the general literature of the country—the first American novel that was ever printed, one of the earliest of American poems, the newspapers and the colleges—was equally earnest in its protests. "If we judge the future by the past," said Jonathan Edwards, jr., in 1791, "within fifty years from this time it will be as shameful for a man to hold a negro slave, as to be guilty of common robbery or theft."

"In the Federal Convention itself, which, though not authorized to act upon the internal affairs of the separate states, was yet bound in some sort to recognize them, the utmost pains were taken, not only to exclude the word *slave* and the word *servitude* from the instrument of government, but to shut out every expression or phrase which, even by implication, would sanction the right of property in man. "We intend this Constitution," said Madison, addressing the Convention, "to be the GREAT CHARTER OF HUMAN LIBERTY to the unborn millions who shall enjoy its protection, and who should never see that such an institution as slavery was ever known in our midst." He did not say that the Constitution was designed only for the white race, but for all who might seek its protection, and that to them it must prove, not the seal and warrant of death, but a savor of life unto life. And in that spirit every clause was framed and adopted; not a word, not a syllable, not a letter, not the crossing of a *t* or the dotting of an *i* was allowed in it which should give a justification or perpetuity to bondage; but the whole of it looked towards a speedy and universal freedom. In that spirit it was accepted by the states; it could never have been adopted, if it had been supposed that it would prolong slavery; the friends of it were careful to assure the people that, in ratifying it, "they would do nothing towards holding the blacks in slavery." The first Congress which assembled under it, re-enacted the perpetual interdict against slavery in the territories, which had been applied by the ordinance of '87; the first executive government organized by it, had Washington for its head, "whose strongest wish," he said in a letter, "was to see slavery abolished;" for its vice-president, John Adams, who had said, that "consenting to slavery would be a sacrilegious breach of trust;" and for its principal secretaries, Jefferson and Hamilton, both conspicuous for their hatred of the accursed thing; while the first judiciary had for its chief-justice John Jay, president of the New York Abolition Society, whose whole life was consecrated to the extinction of what he termed, the "sin of crimson dye."

Yet the present Chief Justice of the United States would fain persuade us that the noble men of those days were quite indifferent to the condition and fate of the African race, and legislated in utter disregard of their existence, and with an exclusive reference to themselves and their posterity.—But we see by these testimonies how mistaken he is; and we shall see how mistaken he is, also, on another capital point, by what is now to be adduced. He errs, not merely as to the prevailing sentiment of the Fathers of the Republic and of the civilized world, but he errs no less grossly in his special application of that sentiment to the exclusion of Africans from the rank of citizens. His logic, on this latter head, if put in the old syllogistic form, would virtually run thus:

Major. Many Africans were degraded.
Minor. But degraded men can not be citizens.
Conclusion. Therefore, no Africans were citizens.

Unfortunately for such a deduction, however, it is as vicious in fact as it is in logic. In a large majority of the states at and about the time the Federal Constitution went into effect, the tests of citizenship were not derived from color or race. The negroes were mostly a degraded class, no doubt, because negroes had been slaves—like women and children, also, the free colored men were not elected to office; but, like women and children, they were, nevertheless, citizens. Judge Curtis has stated the fact broadly, in regard to the free native-born inhabitants of *five* of the states—of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina—that, though African descent, they were not only citizens, but possessed the elective franchise, if endowed with the other qualifications, equally with other citizens. But Judge Curtis might have gone further; a more complete examination of the records has shown that, out of the thirteen original states, only three of them—South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware—had restricted even the right of suffrage to the basis of color; while in all the others, either under royal charters or independent constitutions, the only restrictions refer to age, residence, and property. Six of these states—namely, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and North Carolina—had formed constitutions before the Federal Constitution went into effect, and we quote from the provisions of two of them, which were the most largely slaveholding, as specimens of all the rest.

"MARYLAND.—Constitution formed Aug. 14, 1776.

"*Declaration of Rights.*—1. That all government of right originates from *the people*, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of *the whole*. 2. That the *people* of this state ought to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and police thereof. 3. That the *inhabitants* of Maryland are entitled to the *common law of England*, and the trial by jury, etc. 5. That the right, *in the people*, to participate in the Legislature, is the best security of liberty, and the foundation of all free government; for this purpose elections ought to be *free* and frequent, and *every man, having property in a common interest with, and an attachment to, the community, ought to have the right of suffrage.*

"THE CONSTITUTION AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT.—That the House of Delegates shall be chosen in the following manner: All *free men* above 21 years of age, having a freehold of 50 acres of land in the county in which they offer to vote, and residing therein, and all freemen having property in this state above the value of £30 current money, and having resided in the county in which they offer to vote, one whole year next preceeding the election, shall have a right of suffrage in the election of Delegates for said county," etc.—Art. 2.

"NORTH CAROLINA.—Constitution formed December 18, 1776.

"*Declaration of Rights.*—1. That all political power is vested in, and derived from, *the people* only. 2. That *the people* of this state ought to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and the police thereof. 3. That *no man, or set of men*, are entitled to *exclusive* or separate emoluments or *privileges* from the community, but in consideration of public services. 6. That elections of members to serve as Representatives in General Assembly, ought to be *free*.

"THE CONSTITUTION OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT.—That *all persons possessed of a freehold*, in any town in this state, having a right to representation, and also all freemen who have been inhabitants of any such town twelve months next before and at the day of election, and shall have paid public taxes, shall be entitled to vote for a member to represent such town in the House of Commons," etc.

Two of the states—Rhode Island and Connecticut—at the time the Federal Constitution was formed, still acted under the royal charters, which, of course, made no distinctions of color; and two of them—Pennsylvania and Georgia—formed their constitutions subsequent to the Federal Constitution; but neither of them required that voters should belong to any particular race. If negroes did not vote in these states, it was because they did not own sufficient property, and not because they were negroes. Thus, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware, alone remain to support the decision of Justice Taney, and as the ground of the sweeping disfranchisement which he has promulged! There is but one qualification, common to these early constitutions, which we marvel that the sagacity of the Supreme Court had not discovered. It is that the electors should possess a freehold, or a certain rate of property; and, on the principle of the reasoning of the court, we humbly ask, whether any native is now a citizen of the United States, whose father, or grandfather was not a property-holder in one of the original Thirteen?

More might be said of this decision, for which we have now no space; we have been anxious, in what we have said, to vindicate the truth of history; and, above all, to rescue from calumny the good names of our fathers, and from abuse that immortal document—the Declaration of Independence. That instrument has hitherto commended itself to the affections of our people, and to the admiration of the lovers of liberty, all over the globe, as the great charter and exponent of universal humanity. It has inspired us with our purest and noblest ideals, and it has furnished to oppressed people elsewhere their firmest grounds of hope. But, if it were only what the Chief Justice of the United States declares, an outgrowth of the mean and miserable prejudices of a race—if it had no loftier motive than the consecration of a class-supremacy, if, in a word, the unqualified language of it is fallacious, and wherever it speaks of all men it means only certain men—then it is shorn of its glory; mankind have been deceived in it; and we, as a nation, had better spurn it away from us, or trample it ten thousand feet under the earth. But it is not so; the minds and the hearts of the whole world have not been deceived; the Declaration of Independence means what it says; and, in spite of all the pettifogging of so-called justices—whether Chief or Puisne—we shall still be permitted to hold, that 'All men are created free and equal.'"

The New Governor of Kanzas as a Private Financier.

A Washington letter to the Boston *Traveler*, says of Mr. Walker:

Notwithstanding his high character as a public financier, his private transactions may be classed with those of Sheridan. It is said he never pays a debt of any kind or amount until he is absolutely forced to do so by process of law, and even then it is exceedingly difficult to obtain redress. It is said that he still owes for the rent of the house he occupied when Secretary of the Treasury, and that his landlord, after repeated trials, has given up all hope of recovering the debt even by law. One of our banks here sued him for a large debt, obtained judgment, and attempted to levy on his property, when it was discovered that if the honorable gentleman had any property, it was so placed as to be out of the reach of his creditors.

No one pretends to say that Mr. Walker is dishonest, but it seems to be the opinion of all, even those who have suffered most, that it is the thoughtlessness of his own affairs which places him in this condition, and that it is not the love, but the want of money that leads him into difficulty. When he has money it flows like water; when he has credit his expenses are equally unlimited; when he is without credit he relies upon his resources, which are unlimited as his extravagance; anecdotes of his treatment of money are abundant. But a few weeks ago, he presented a check at the counter of one of our banks for $1,500, which was given to him at his request in small bills. The teller counted it out and handed him the bunch, when he thrust a part in one vest pocket and a part in the other, and the rest in his coat-tail pocket as he would a handkerchief.

The teller intimated that Mr. W. had better count the money, as he might have made a mistake, and added that mistakes would not be corrected after leaving the counter; but the intimation received no attention, and Mr. Walker walked off with the money thus loose in his pockets, and even liable to drop out. No one charges him with heartlessness, but rather with unjust generosity. If a beggar requests charity, he is as likely to give an eagle as a dime, and more likely if the gold is the most handy. He is prodigal in his promises of payment and in his expressions of sorrow at the inconvenience his creditors suffer; and if he has the money in hand at the moment the bill is presented, will readily pay; but if not, the creditor must stand his chance.

To Pre-emptors.

The following circular from the General Land Office will be of interest to many persons who have settled on government lands:

GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Dec. 3rd, 1856.

Gentlemen: By the fourth section of the act of the third of March, 1843, it is declared that "Where an individual has filed under the late pre-emption law (1841) his declaration of intention to claim the benefits of said law for one tract of land, it shall not be lawful for the same individual, at any future time, to file a second declaration for another tract.

This prohibition is held by the department to extend to both classes of lands, unoffered, and such as are subject to private entry.

When a claimant, however, of either class of land, files a declaration which may prove to be invalid in consequence of the land applied for not being open for pre-emption, or by the determination against him as a conflicting claimant; or from any other similar cause, which would have prevented him from consummating a pre-emption under such declaration; such illegal filing will be treated as a nullity and as no inhibition to his subsequently filing a legal and proper declaration for the same tract, should it become liable to pre-emption, or for any other land; it being the purpose of the law to allow a claimant a pre-emption upon one tract and nothing more, and also to prevent declaration from being filed where the intention of establishing a pre-emption is not bona-fide. I am very respectfully, gentlemen, your obedient servant.

THOS. A. HENDRICKS,
Commissioner.

GREAT DEEDS.—The spoken word, the written poem, is said to be an epitome of the man; how much more the done work.—Whatsoever of morality and intelligence; what of patience, perseverance, faithfulness, of method, insight, ingenuity, energy; in a word, whatsoever of strength the man had in him will lie written in the work he does. Great honor to him whose epic is a melodious hexameter Iliad. But still greater honor, if his epic be a mighty empire slowly built together, a mighty series of heroic deeds—a mighty conquest over chaos.—There is no mistaking this latter epic. Deeds are greater than words. Deeds have such a life, mute but undeniable, and grow as living trees and fruit trees do; they people the vacuity of time, and make it green and worthy.—CARLYLE.

Beautify Your Home.

There are two kinds of beauty; one is outward, the other is inward. The outward beauty of home is in pleasant grounds, walks, shrubbery, flowers, trees, rooms, furniture, pictures, and whatsoever can render it agreeable to the eye, and suggest happy and virtuous thoughts to the mind. Of this kind of beauty we have much, in and about our houses. A vine arbor, a flower bed, a grass plat, a rose bush, a gravel walk, a shade tree, a pleasant yard, are easily had, especially by farmers and villagers. No one with hands and health, should be without such adornments to his home. A child even, can plant a flower seed, or a shrub; and if properly taught and encouraged, will be glad to engage in such pleasant labors. In odd morning and evening hours how much may be done to beautify one's home. If every week adds a little and every year *more*, how *much* will be done, in and about one's dwelling, to give it an air of cheerful beauty. And of all beauty, that which is natural is most to be admired, such as grows, bears and blossoms.

But if outward beauty is within the reach of *all*, how *much more* is inward beauty!—In a household, how beautiful is a good husband, wife, brother, sister, father, mother and child. How beautiful are pleasant faces, loving eyes, affectionate words, kind offices, and sympathising hearts. How beautiful are honesty, sincerity, good will, generosity, kindness, sympathy, affection. How beautiful is religion as it speaks in words of love and prayer, and glows in acts of benevolence and forgiveness. What outward adornment can compare with the grace of a chaste and loving heart, or the charms of a kind and honest life?

Houses are under the control of those who dwell in them. We make our own houses, or help make them. The beauty that is in them or about them is of our own making, at least in part. If they lack beauty, it is our own fault. Beauty, both outward and inward, is within our own reach. It is an attainment we may all possess.

What object in life is more commendable than to beautify our homes? What is home but the spring-source of all that is great and good in human life. Here are born and reared the world's children, its great and good men and women, philosophers, philanthropists, statesmen, scholars and christians. Out from home go all the best and holiest influences that bless mankind. Into the heart of home flow the treasures of the world, the products of its labors.

For home we all live and toil, more than for all else of the earth. Why then should it not be beautified? It is clear to my mind that the best religion in the world is that which grows and thrives best at home; so that out from home goes the virtues, loves and spirits that constitute and people heaven. What else then is more glorious to live for than to beautify our homes? In so doing we are sowing seeds which shall grow in heaven. We are planting virtues which shall bear fruit among angels. Then let our homes be beautified both with outward and inward adornment; we shall thereby be better and happier, and goodness and happiness will give us wisdom.—*Valley Farmer.*

Delaware Almost a Free State.

We notice that various newspapers North and South are speculating upon the probable future, in view of the rapid decrease of slavery in the border slave States. Little Delaware comes in for its share of consideration under these circumstances, for it is so nearly a free State as to make it difficult to tell which section of the Union to rank it with. The Buffalo *Advertiser* takes from the census the following figures, showing the number of slaves in Delaware at each decennial period:

Years	Slaves.	Years.	Slaves.
1790,	8,887	1830,	3,292
1800,	6,153	1840,	2,605
1810,	4,177	1850,	2,290
1820,	4,509		

At the date of the last census the slaves only formed two and a half per cent. of the population of the State, while free negroes were about twenty per cent. The increase of free colored people in the State has been from 3,899 in 1790, to 18,078 in 1850. In effect, Delaware is now nearly as much a free State as New Jersey or Illinois. The anti-slavery sentiment has a strong hold upon the population. At the Presidential election last fall no less than 302 votes were polled in one county for the Republican electoral ticket.—Had the State been thoroughly organized by the Republicans, we do not doubt that they would have polled at least one-third of the whole vote cast. The census of 1860 will show a large decrease of the slaves, and make more manifest the fact that Delaware has ceased to be distinctly a slave State.—*Mo. Democrat.*

The Slave Trade.

After a temporary lull, the Spring slave-trade has fairly begun. It was never more active than within the past three weeks, during which time at least seven slavers have sailed or been seized *en voyage*. The United States officials in some cases are unable to obtain sufficient evidence to warrant the seizure of the vessel or the arrest of the actual owners. These men, probably less than three score in all, owners, officers and crews, carry on a traffic, which is too lucrative to be abandoned for slight reasons—so lucrative, indeed, that the captain of the schooner lately seized off the Cuban coast, said that he did not mind the loss of $30,000 in consequence—in utter defiance of the law through whose meshes they have thus far managed to escape. Will not Congress, at its next session, pass a statute which shall cover the difficulties of the case, and render the conviction of all guilty parties certain? How long must this city continue to be the rendezvous of the blackest pirates known to the civilized or uncivilized world? Cannot we, at least, have a couple of cruisers more—who knows if we have any?—with plenty of gunboats off the coast of Africa, and two or three more hovering in the vicinity of Cuba? With the District-Attorney and Marshal on the look-out here, and efficient officers on the look-out there, we might hope for some success in the treatment of these scoundrels. Otherwise the seizure of a vessel now and then will produce no effect upon the traffic itself.—*N. Y. Tribune.*